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Developing Resilience to ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞĚƌŽƵŐŚƚƐ ?
Time for Cap and Trade?   
Abstract 
 
Much of England is seriously water stressed and future droughts will present major 
challenges to the water industry if socially and economically damaging supply restrictions 
are to be avoided. Demand management is seen as a key mechanism for alleviating water 
stress, yet there are no truly effective incentives to encourage widespread adoption of the 
behavioural and technological demand management practices available.  Water pricing 
could promote conservation, but on its own it is an inefficient tool for dealing with short 
term restriction in water supply. Raising prices over the short term in response to a drought 
is likely to be ineffectual in lowering demand sufficiently; conversely, maintaining high 
prices over the long term implies costs to the consumer which are needlessly high most of 
the time. We propose a system for developing resilience to drought in highly water stressed 
areas, based on a cap and trade (C&T) model. The system would represent a significant 
innovation in ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ water market. However, international experience shows that C&T is 
successful in other sectors, and need not be overly complex. Here, we open the debate on 
how a C&T system might work in England.   
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1. Introduction 
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Despite its importance, England  lacks a permanently secure water supply. Rising 
demand, coupled with climate change and the prospect of drought, means that periodically 
water becomes a scarce resource. England has experienced drought over the last 40 years 
(Environment Agency, 2012a), including the dry winter of 1975 and hot dry summer of 1976 
when nationally water was rationed via standpipes; the 1989-90 drought which impacted on 
groundwater and led to spray irrigation restrictions in East England; the 1995-96  Pennine 
drought where road tankers transferred water from Northumbria to some Yorkshire 
reservoirs; the 2005-07 drought where restrictions were imposed on 15 million people in SE 
England; and in both 2010 and 2011, when the driest springs ever recorded in the north 
west and east respectively led to further restrictions.  
Water companies learnt from these experiences (e.g. distribution networks are more 
connected, although disconnects between companies largely remain). However, measures 
introduced to deal with past droughts may be insufficient to deal with future drought, 
influenced by climate change. For 23 UK water regions Rahiz and New (2013) analysed 
drought characteristics of ensemble projections made using the Meteorological Office 
Hadley Centre regional climate model. They found profound increases in drought intensity, 
duration and extent for the 2050s and 2080s, with more winter (wet season) drought, 
particularly  in the south where water resources are already stressed but the population is 
growing - in absolute terms England currently has the greatest population growth in the EU 
(ONS 2013). Whilst water is clearly a very important resource, and often a commodity, its 
value varies in time, space and by activity - i.e. by who is using it, for what, where, and 
when. It is variously essential for life, critical for some economic activities but only useful for 
others, whilst some is wasted. In general the marginal utility derived from water use is 
typically very high at low levels of consumption, whilst there is often a very low marginal 
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utility at high rates of use. Under scarcity, this is inefficient from a societal welfare 
perspective, as more utility could be derived by a better allocation of the resource in space, 
over time, and by use, and between users who value the water differently.    
This situation is readily seen  in the case of UK drought orders which allow the 
regulator to place restrictions ŽŶ ?ŶŽŶ-ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ƵƐĞƐ ?ƚŚŽƐĞŚĂǀŝŶŐĂůŽǁĞƌŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƵƚŝůŝƚǇ
(Environment Agency, 2012a). Thus commercial car washes are suspended recognising the 
higher marginal benefit of supplying water for, say household use, over keeping our cars 
clean.  Similarly, drought permits allow relaxation of abstraction limits, allowing utilities to 
take water normally reserved for ecological support functions, so as to maintain public 
supply. This recognises the higher marginal utility people associate with meeting their basic 
water needs, over that they gain from protecting the environment. It is ironic of course, that 
regulators issue drought permits when environmental water requirements are greatest. 
Environmental impacts of recent UK droughts include fish deaths, reduced breeding of 
wading birds and outbreaks of poisonous blue-green algae. Reducing compensation flows 
from reservoirs that support ecological requirements adds complexity to drought decision 
making (and releases prior to recognition of a drought development will in retrospect be 
seen as a loss of resource). Such failures are permitted under Article 1 (section 4.6) of the 
EU Water Framework Directive which allows temporary non-compliance with good 
ecological status objectives during times of drought, so long ĂƐƐƵĐŚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇďĞĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŶ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂƉŚƌĂƐĞŽƉĞŶƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŝƚƐƐĞĞŵƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
given mounting evidence (Burke et al., 2010; Rahiz and New, 2013) to expect that future 
droughts may be more extreme, thus in effect the directive argues for drought planning 
rather than crisis management.  
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Water is essentially a non-substitutable resource, especially in the short term, when 
it is difficult to switch quickly to an alternative source. Thus under scarcity conservation 
campaigns encourage a change in behaviour (shower not bath, turning tap off when 
brushing teeth etc.), activities that people would like to engage in (e.g. garden watering) are 
restricted, and in extremis water may be rationed via street standpipes. The less extreme 
conservation campaigns may change water use behaviour during drought and deliver 
demand reductions (Queensland Water Commission, 2010), but imply a loss of welfare as 
customers would prefer to consume more. This is illustrated by Fielding et al., (2013) who 
used smart meters to provide water conservation advice in a study of 221 households in 
Queensland. They found that different forms of water conservation advice (general, tailored 
to households, tailored with feedback) all reduced demand compared with a control, but 
that within a year savings had dissipated and water use had returned in all cases to pre 
intervention levels, despite customers paying on a volumetric basis. Such an outcome has 
also been reported by a UK water plc. (at a meeting under Chatham House rules) for all 
interventions it had tried. 
Voluntary behavioural change has a role in demand management but appears a 
weak instrument reliant upon voluntary restriction and acceptance of reduced levels of 
service. More effective demand management implies raising prices significantly, and/or 
embedding the fixed conservation practices offered by technological change (e.g. low flush 
toilets, replacing high use appliances and fittings, installing rainwater harvesting or grey 
water recycling, or altering production processes and product designs to reduce water 
requirements) (Butler and Memon, 2006). Metering is often perceived to be a demand 
management tool, but in England, people opting to switch to a metered supply are self-
selected and in the majority of cases do so because they believe they are low water users.  
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Furthermore some water companies, recognising the bad press suffered by energy 
companies for not guiding customers to the lowest tariff, are seeking to identify all those 
customers they believe to be low water users likely to benefit from a metered tariff. 
 Numerous instruments can reduce demand but their effectiveness under a 
prolonged drought is questionable, given their constraints (Table 1). A recent UK water 
industry summit concluded that current conservation measures could soften the impact of a 
prolonged drought, but were insufficient to deal with a prolonged drought, and that 
alternative approaches that promote a package of measures, including the use of dynamic 
tariffs, was needed (St George, 2013:p5).   
                                                 TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Most countries with high rates of metering use a uniform block tariff (where the unit 
price is independent of volume consumed) or increasingly an inclining block tariff (IBT) 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŽĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ?ǁĂƐƚĞĨƵů ?ƵƐĞ ?ďǇĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂůŽǁor zero price for an initial 
ďůŽĐŬŽĨ ?ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ǁĂƚĞƌƵƐĞ ?with higher prices for subsequent blocks (Worthington and 
Hoffman 2007; Crase et al., 2007; Herrington, 2007 ? ?/d ?ƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚŽŶƐŽĐŝĂů
equity grounds as revenue from higher tier blocks offsets the low cost of the initial block. 
However, IBTs have been criticised on both philosophical and operational grounds.  
Zetland (2011:p39) advises caution with respect to IBTs as in well-functioning 
markets we do not see companies raising unit prices as quantity purchased increases, and 
because they suppress demand via cost, not scarcity or value. Conceptually simple, IBTs 
actually represent a complex billing structure where the number, size and price of blocks 
must be set precisely to match the local context; however, regulators have been unable to 
provide guidance on how to do this, because IBTs often depart from marginal cost pricing 
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(NWC, 2008) whilst the average or marginal prices under an IBT are themselves exceedingly 
difficult to determine (Boland and Whittington, 2000).  
 IBTs are also criticised for being ineffective in suppressing demand. Low users 
receive the wrong price signal, so use more than they would otherwise do, whilst the 
relatively price inelastic nature of water (Worthington and Hoffman 2007) means that 
narrow blocks with very substantial rises in price are required to supress demand. 
Australia ?Ɛ National Water Commission (NWC, 2008) concluded IBTs were not very effective 
in influencing consumption as the cost impact of reaching higher tiers is not evident in time 
to respond. Recent UK trials of IBTs have also so far found them to be relatively ineffective 
in prompting behavioural change (Environment Agency, 2013a).  This is particularly salient 
in the context of tackling acute scarcity under drought (Monteiro and Roseta-Palma, 2011).  
IBTs are also criticised on grounds of cost recovery, as low users pay below cost 
price; use at higher tiers may cross-subsidise these costs but the tariff structure may need to 
be steeply raked to do so, thus making revenue unstable and unpredictable (Crase et al., 
2007).  Additionally, IBTs do not protect low income households, one of their chief 
attractions in principle. In practice, low income households tend to be larger on average, 
and the initial low cost blocks are thus used sooner, putting the household into the higher 
price blocks (Dahan and Nisan 2007;  OECD 2009; NWC 2008). This problem can be rectified 
using per capita pricing but household occupancy data needed to do this is rarely available, 
hence utilities assume conservative (high) occupancy rates that mean pricing is inefficient 
(Zetland, 2011). The difficulty with per capita pricing (and recognition that low income 
households tend to have the least resource efficient homes) led the UK parliament to reject 
the use of IBTs in the domestic energy market (House of Commons, 2013).  Thus whilst 
8 
 
there are merits to IBTs there are evidently difficulties that brings into conflict the 
fundamental equity, efficiency and affordability goals of sustainable water allocation.  
Alternatives to the uniform block tariff are being explored in the UK, and rather than focus 
solely on the IBT, it seems timely to debate a wider range of structures to manage demand.  
We argue that demand management via pricing alone is unlikely to be a successful in 
dealing with ephemeral, yet acute scarcity.  Consumers, domestic and commercial,  will be 
able to respond to price rises by investing in more water efficient appliances, technology 
and processes. However, for the market as a whole, such investment decisions come in 
response to long term cost drivers. Over the short term, when a drought hits, most 
customers will be unable to invest in technological demand management in  time due to a 
lack of capacity to implement appropriate measures, or a lack of capacity in the business 
sector providing water conservation goods and services - the market cannot respond 
adequately to drought induced scarcity prices. So, pricing alone does not seem able to 
deliver a degree of resilience to weather a major drought or succession of droughts.     
Supply side measures, including investment in storage and enhanced distribution 
network connectivity can raise water security. These, together with existing demand 
management measures have largely been effective in averting major restrictions to date, 
but also face difficulties. New reservoirs are unpopular and take decades to get through the 
planning system, desalination implies large carbon emissions, and there are limits to which 
leakage can be economically controlled or distribution network efficiency enhanced, 
particularly as droughts are expected to become spatially more extensive (Rahiz and New, 
2013) so water companies may not have supplies to share. Strategic supply side 
developments designed to add resilience and reduce risk from drought implies investment 
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that may become harder to deliver as customer acceptability of, and willingness to pay for, 
proposed expenditures becomes more explicitly embedded in the price review process 
(OFWAT, 2013).  That said, customer views on what they seek from a water company has 
provided evidence that a safe reliable water supply is a fundamental customer requirement. 
There is then concern that the conventional responses to water stress, as well as the 
wider application of pricing that will come with growth in metering, will prove inadequate in 
the long run, particularly given the uncertainty that climate change brings. Whilst the UK 
water industry is geared to coping with a dry winter, and can weather a two dry winter 
sequence albeit with restrictions and significant impacts (Environment Agency, 2012b), it is 
unlikely that we could cope with a three dry winter sequence without large areas facing 
severe shortages requiring draconian cuts (St George, 2013:p5). This was recognised by 
Caroline Spelman who as Environment Secretary raised the possibility of standpipes in the 
street  if the country is hit by three dry winter in a row (Telegraph, 2012).  Although a 
national drought plan exists (Environment Agency, 2012b), the plan does not plan for 
drought but plans a reaction within the drought specifying what options become available 
within a drought and who communicates with whom. Valuable as far as it goes it is 
nevertheless reactive and does not proactively defend against future drought.   
Here, we suggest a water resource management system based on the Cap and Trade 
(C&T) concept. It offers potential to overcome the problems discussed above, delivering 
resilience against drought, by driving effective demand management amongst consumers, 
and so supporting a more cost-efficient investment in supply side measures. The system 
would act to better incentivise a package of demand management measures, which the 
ǁĂƚĞƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽŚĞĚŐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ ?ůĂĐŬ^ǁĂŶƐ ?ŽĨĨƵƚƵƌĞĚƌŽƵŐŚƚƐ
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(St George, 2013). Our intention here is not to present a detailed scheme but to initiate 
debate on the relative merits of a C&T system for water stressed parts of England, so as to 
deliver resilience to drought. 
2. Cap and Trade  
C&T is an economic instrument that tackles common pool resource problems. The best 
known applications address emissions to air or water;  a market is created in the assimilative 
capacity of the receiving environment, and users (emitters) of that capacity acquire an 
allowance (emission credits) that permits them to emit. Credits are allocated in various 
ways, by auction and by historical use are common, although other means exist. Users who 
emit below their allowance can sell surplus credits to those who need to emit more than 
their credit allowance permits.   Over the long term, the emission credits market encourages 
investment in emission reduction technology, and innovation.  The regulator can lower the 
cap over time to drive a continual reduction in emissions. The UK participates in such a 
system for carbon, via the EU emission trading scheme  (DECC, 2013). The scheme, 
introduced in 2005, has delivered modest emission reductions so far because of a low unit 
price following an initial over allocation of carbon credits (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008) but 
proponents anticipate that Phase III (2013-2020) will deliver more significant reductions (in 
excess of 1% per annum) now that the infrastructure and market are established. The 
refusal of MEPs to back plans to delay the release of ETS credits is however expected to see 
the persistence of low carbon prices within the scheme (IEMA, 2013).  
Other systems are operating very successfully. The longest running C&T scheme is for 
acidifying gases, where the market involves all the large emitters in 27 states in NE USA. This 
EPA regulated scheme has seen emissions of SO2 fall 60% and NOx by 65% since the cap was 
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imposed (1990 and 1995 respectively) (US EPA, no date). In England, Yorkshire Water Ltd  
have explored a real time river integration system (rtRiveri), making more efficient use of a 
rivers pollutant assimilative capacity by discharging a greater share of effluent at time of 
ƉĞĂŬĨůŽǁ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐĐŚĞŵĞŝŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ,ƵŶƚĞƌsĂůůĞǇŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŵƵĐŚ
further. Here, problematic saline discharges from mining and power generation have been 
managed on a similar temporally dynamic (hourly) basis linked to river flow, but with total 
permissible salt discharges to river capped, with a market in emission credits. This scheme 
has lowered salt levels in the Hunter river below target levels despite a drier than average 
period, making water suitable for agricultural irrigation again (DEC, 2006). A US C&T scheme 
addresses point and diffuse source water pollutants under the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination Scheme (US EPA, 2007). These established systems are delivering substantive 
environmental benefits, often with emission reductions greater than originally sought, as 
emitters are incentivised to find innovative ways of reducing emissions, so that they can sell 
unused credits.  
C&T schemes are not limited to emissions. In fisheries, the strategy of simply restricting 
the total allowable catch (TAC), proved unsuccessful as it encouraged individual fishers to 
over invest in large vessels so they could harvest as much as possible before the quota was 
reached. However, a TAC (a cap) allied with an individual transferable quota (ITQ), a share of 
the quota that can be traded between fishers allows the relatively more efficient fishers to 
purchase rights from those who are less efficient, thus lowering overall capital cost, whilst 
staying within the environmental capacity. Such a scheme started in 1986 in New Zealand 
and has since been adopted in other fisheries around the world (Anderson, 1995).       
        ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?ƐsĞŚŝĐůĞYƵŽƚĂ^ǇƐƚĞm is another example (LTA, 2013). For each vehicle 
owned, a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) must be held. These can be purchased at a twice 
12 
 
ŵŽŶƚŚůǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĞƚĂƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŶƵŵďĞƌĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝƐĐĂƉƉĞĚ ?ĂŶĚK ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ
cars) must be retired after ten years. This has acted to reduce congestion, energy use and 
emissions (as newer vehicles with cleaner technology are introduced more quickly) and has 
made public transport alternatives economically more viable (Olszewski, 2007). C&T 
schemes have also been discussed with respect to energy. A tradable fuel economy scheme 
has been proposed for US car manufacturers (NRC, 2001: 90-93), whilst in the UK, the 
ĨĞĂƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨdƌĂĚĂďůĞŶĞƌŐǇYƵŽƚĂ ?Ɛ ?dY ?Ɛ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚďƵŝůĚƐŽŶ,ŝůůŵĂŶĂŶĚ&ĂǁĐĞƚƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
work on the Personal Carbon Allowance,  has been the subject of a recent parliamentary 
feasibility appraisal (Fleming and Chamberlin, 2011).   
Water trading is already possible in England, where since 2001 holders of water rights 
can trade some or all of their abstraction licence, although in practice few trades have 
occurred (Synovate UK, 2008). The practice allows a licence holder to sell rights to any 
surplus supply, so more efficient use of the total resource can be made. However, this is 
unlikely to foster greatly increased resilience to drought, as the trade encourages the more 
efficient spatial distribution of water, rather than its conservation. A water trading system 
also exists in Australia promoted by the National Water Commission (NWC), facilitating 
water redistribution from areas of surplus to deficit. However, there is evidently a lack of 
infrastructure to allow transfers to take place, and the scheme similarly promotes efficient 
spatial distribution, rather than demand management (as the trading is between abstraction 
rights holders, not consumers). The NWC also recognises that water rights trading per se 
does not amount to effective drought planning (Hamstead et al., 2008: xvi).  
 
3.  A Water Cap and Trade System for England? 
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Our view is that a C&T system has potential to bring about a step change in ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ 
resilience to drought, with added benefits in non-drought years. In contrast to the schemes 
discussed above, we extend membership to all consumers, rather than simply abstractors, in 
a similar manner to that proposed for TEQs (Fleming and Chamberlin, 2011) as our prime 
motivation is to promote demand management in consumers, rather than a more efficient 
spatial distribution of abstraction rights. This is important, because whilst an efficient spatial 
ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƚĞƌůĞĂĚƐƚŽĂŵŽƌĞĞǀĞŶĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ŚĞĂĚƌŽŽŵ ? ?ƐƵƉƉůǇůĞƐƐĚĞŵĂŶĚ ?it 
will not deliver the added headroom required to weather a prolonged drought. Below we 
consider how such a water C&T system might operate. 
3.1  The Cap 
The cap and its geography are defined. The cap is the maximum permitted to be 
abstracted within a region per year. The region must reflect physical geography so a river 
basin could be suitable, but in practice company distribution networks would better define 
the linkage of sources and customers.  Additionally, the institutional arrangements required 
by a water C&T system would likely mean that water company areas are the defined C&T 
market areas. A complication to defining the cap area will arise if ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ water industry is 
restructured along the lines of the energy industry.  This would  most likely see separation of 
customer services (essentially the billing function)  from the engineering dominated,  supply 
and waste management.  A closer parallel to the energy sector would see further separation 
of the distribution network from the sources and treatment.   While there is occasional 
debate on the separation of water supply and waste disposal this would seem counter to all 
the benefits of an integrated system and to act to reduce the benefits of real time 
integration between the engineering system and natural environment.  Here, we assume 
14 
 
that the retail function - selling water services to the customer - might at some future point 
be independent of the wholesale function - the provision of the goods and services since 
many companies have already made this separation by having contracted out billing.  We 
assume no further sectoral segmentation.  
The cap is set to reflect the total abstraction required for a low supply period. Initially 
this might  be a 1 in 25 year return peƌŝŽĚ ?ĚƌŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƵŶĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐĐĂƉǁŽƵůĚ
give time for users to become familiar with the system (and perhaps phase different sectors 
in over time), and invest in water conservation (technology and water conservation 
behaviour). An undemanding cap would be unable to fully address a more serious drought, 
should it occur, although greater resilience to it would be developed. Subsequently the cap 
could be lowered to defend against more serious droughts, thus developing greater long 
term security of supply / resilience and promoting responses to demographic and climatic 
change forecasts. Conversely, a cap could  also be raised to reflect any added resource made 
available from supply infrastructure investment (including resources secured from 
neighbouring regions via water trading arrangements as discussed in section 2).  
3.2 Scheme membership 
Everyone is enrolled. To work effectively, the scheme must be mandatory for all 
consumers. To encourage water conservation behaviour, the scheme must incentivise the 
water user, who is best placed to implement demand management, rather than an 
 ?ƵƉƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌǇ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ the supplying water utility. If the scheme only involved 
intermediaries, there would be insufficient agents to develop a competitive market (and 
potentially, given the regional nature of the scheme set out in 3.1, only one). Note that 
although water rights trading has been operational in the UK for over a decade, very few 
15 
 
trades between institutions have been made, and on average, trades take 6-18 months to 
implement (Synovate UK, 2008).  
Whilst all consumers must participate in the scheme, sectors (e.g. commercial, 
domestic) could be phased in to ease implementation.  This would require a sector specific 
cap to be set, apportioned according to historical use of that sector. Once all sectors were 
within the scheme, then trading across, not just within sectors would be possible to 
maximise conservation opportunities.  The only consumers exempt from the scheme would 
be those (households,  businesses) with a private supply, but  their abstraction would be 
accounted for when setting the cap.  We assume the substantial cost of obtaining a private 
supply (e.g. drilling a borehole) will dissuade most customers from exempting themselves 
from the system by developing a private supply.  However, new private supply development 
already requires authorisation of the Environment Agency if minimum abstraction 
thresholds are exceeded, hence there is regulation in place which could be amended to 
force enrolment of new abstraction into the C&T system.  
3.3 Paying for Water: Bills and TWUCs 
All members are metered. For a water C&T system to work well, there is a 
requirement to have accurate records of consumption thus all customers must be on a 
metered supply (although see the online appendix for possible application to non-metered 
customers). Currently, no water company meters all its customers, and nationally, meter 
uptake is only around 42% (but with considerable regional variation). However, the Water 
Industry (Prescribed Conditions) Regulations 1999, gives the power to compulsorily meter 
all customers. The main qualifying condition for compulsory metering and a volumetric 
charge (which a C&T system implies ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂƌĞĂŝƐ ?ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇǁĂƚĞƌƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?
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considering current and projected demand and supply  (Table 2 shows qualifying water 
companies). As climate changes and/or projected demand increases, more areas may 
ďĞĐŽŵĞ ?ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?/ƚŝƐĞǆĂĐƚůǇƚŚŝƐŚŝŐŚǁĂƚĞƌƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚĂC&T system is 
designed to alleviate. Note that some utilities have already embarked on universal 
ŵĞƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶtĂƚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵme, began in 2010, should be complete in 2015. Other 
companies, even those outside areas deemed to be water stressed,  are reviewing the 
multiple benefits of an ordered expansion of metering towards a near universal metered 
customer base (McDonald and Boden, 2012).  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Currently metered water customer bills comprise fixed charges (e.g. for surface water 
drainage, pipe/sewer infrastructure), and variable charges (based on volume of water 
supplied/wastewater disposed).  Under a C&T scheme this customer billing process would 
be unchanged, except in respect of one significant addition. When a customer pays their bill, 
they must also surrender a series of Tradable Water Unit Certificates (TWUCs) along with 
the financial remittance for the  fixed and variable charges.  Each TWUC surrendered 
accounts for 1000 litres of water, and is retired after surrender. A two person household 
with an average per capita demand of 137 litres per day would have an annual demand of 
100,000 litres, and hence over the course of four quarterly bills would be required to 
surrender 100 TWUCs along with their financial payment. The electronic infrastructure for 
doing this is already available, and government feasibility studies of the more complex 
Tradable Energy Quota system indicate this is quite practical (Lane et al., 2008).  
dthƐĞǆŝƐƚĂƐƵŶŝƋƵĞĚŝŐŝƚĂůƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ?ŚĞůĚŝŶĂĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ?Ɛdth
account, and could represent multiples of the base unit (10m
3
, 20m
3
 etc.). At the inception 
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of the scheme each customer (household, business etc.) would be given an initial allocation 
by the C&T body (e.g. water utility, overseen by the regulator), which is intended to be 
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĨŽƌŽŶĞǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶĂƚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƌĂƚĞƐ ?ĂĐŚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞC&T body tops up 
thĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ?ƐdthĂĐĐŽƵŶƚǁŝƚŚĂŶĞǁƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨdthƐ ?dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨdthƐĂĚĚĞĚ
each quarter will decline gradually in time, so that the total number of TWUCs allocated in a 
year represent a volume equivalent to the regional cap.  
3.4 Initial Allocation of TWUCs 
Initial allocation reflects past use. To begin,  TWUCs must be allocated to customers. 
There are several ways C&T systems do this, including random access (lotteries), first-come 
first-served, auction, and administrative rules based on eligibility criteria (Tietenberg, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞŵŽƐƚǁŝĚĞůǇƵƐĞĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶďǇĂƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚďǇ ?ŐƌĂŶĚĨĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?
where allocation is based on historical use. An auction has the advantage of raising revenue 
to invest in environmental protection or remediation, but in the case of water, auctions 
would likely prove unworkable as: (a) this would be seen to be an additional cost burden 
for ƚŚĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ? ?ď ?ƐŽŵĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐŵĂǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐƵƉƉůǇ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?Đ ?
there is a risk that some customers will secure insufficient TWUCs to cover their current 
use. An allocation based on measured or estimated historical use is more practical, and is 
usually the most politically acceptable allocation  system, although it has the disadvantage 
of losing auction revenue and any hypothecated investment. Measures to ensure access for 
new entrants are also required for common pool resources making grandfathering 
unpopular for some schemes. However, in our system new entrants would access water 
just as they do now, but would obtain TWUCs,  not from the C&T body, but via an open 
market (see 3.6 and section 5).  
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The larger and potentially more water inefficient customers also receive a larger 
allocation, so to some extent historical allocation rewards past inefficiency. There is also a 
danger that, knowing that TWUCs are to be allocated based on historical use, customers 
would waste water to drive up their reference demand. This would be averted by 
establishing the historical annual use for a year prior to the scheme being announced.  
3.5 Descent to Cap 
Customers gradually receive fewer free TWUCs.  The total number of TWUCs 
available in any one year is fixed, set with reference to the cap, the supply estimated to be 
reliably available in a drought year.  Initially, the number of TWUCs on offer will be well 
above the cap, as the total number of TWUCs is set with reference to historical water use. 
However, each year the total volume of water addressed by the TWUCs will be reduced 
creating a pressure to drive down demand. The total volume reduction could be achieved 
by maintaining the total number of TWUCs in the system and lowering the volumetric value 
of each TWUC (1000, 980 litres, 960 litres etc.) so that customers must purchase more 
TWUCs than before, or reduce demand. However, maintaining a constant TWUC volume of 
1000 litres, and reducing the total number of certificates on offer would be more 
understandable, and means a constant volume is retained regardless of TWUC age.  
The need ƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌdthƐǁŝůůƌĂŝƐĞĂĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ?ƐĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
consumption, and in many, it will change behaviour. This occurs as over time the C&T body 
reduce the number of new TWUCs being released into the system, to bring the total water 
volume represented by the annual release of TWUCs, in line with the regional drought 
abstraction cap. Customers must submit TWUCs that cover their volumetric water use, and 
as the number of free dthƐĂĚĚĞĚƚŽĂĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĂĐŚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƌĞĚƵĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ
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will experience pressure to reduce demand, or purchase additional TWUCs on the open 
market (see 3.6 below), which similarly exerts a downward pressure on consumption.  
The rate at which the number of TWUCs released each year falls will need to be 
determined. If it is too slow, then resilience against drought will not develop quickly 
enough; if it is too fast, then there may be insufficient supporting capacity in the water 
conservation industry (conservation advisors, equipment, installers etc.) to enable 
customers to make the transition.   
A periodic review of the cap would be advisable. If risks associated with climate 
change rise, and there is an expectation that drought frequency, intensity, extent or 
duration increases, then there is a case to lower the cap. Conversely, if additional water 
resources can be reliably secured (greater storage, transfer), then the cap could be raised.   
Because TWUCs are allocated on the basis of historical water use, there is a potential 
inequity in the system, as the more inefficient users receive a greater initial allocation of 
TWUCs. This could be addressed by reducing TWUCs proportionately, rather than 
absolutely  W thus a 5% reduction in TWUC allocation would require a greater absolute 
water saving from a large user, than a small user.  
 3.6 TWUC trading 
Efficient behaviour is rewarded. The rate of customer engagement with the C&T 
system will vary. Some will engage quickly, others will choose to ignore the scheme for as 
long as possible. Both are likely, and such behaviour is accommodated in the TWUC trading 
element of the system. All customers will still receive the normal free quarterly allocation 
of TWUCs (scaled according to the fall in the cap), but a customer whose demand falls will 
find they have an annual surplus of TWUCs.  Conversely a customer whose demand does 
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not fall quickly enough, or indeed rises, may find they have insufficient TWUCs to surrender 
with their bill. At this point, both parties can enter into an open TWUC market, an online 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ĞĂǇĨŽƌdthƐ ? ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĚďǇ the C&T body. Customers would  buy/sell the 
TWUCs at the unit price determined on that trading day, and the financial value (unit price 
x number of TWUCs traded) would be automatically added/debited to the customers utility 
bill. If customers short of TWUCs choose not to engage in the market then the transaction 
would occur automatically on the last day the utility bill is due.  
     In both commercial and domestic cases, trading incentivises demand reduction, via 
behavioural means or technology. TWUC vendors reap long term benefits of water 
conservation behaviour and investment in that they have a lower water bill (as demand has 
fallen) in addition to revenue gained from selling surplus TWUCs. 
3.7 Institutional arrangements 
An incremental development of existing arrangements. OFWAT (working with the 
Environment Agency) would provide regulatory oversight (OFWAT is accountable to 
parliament but independent of them, and water companies). This would include agreeing 
caps and their reduction over time, making the initial TWUC allocation, and oversight of the 
market. Their objective would be to institute a managed transition to a lower demand 
market, with protection of customer access to water at fair market prices, and an adequate 
return on investment to the water utility. Note that whilst the system encourages users to 
consume less, so variable charge revenue to the water utility may decline as a result, there 
would be less need to invest as heavily in water supply infrastructure intended to secure 
supplies under a drought (new reservoir, desalination etc.). Thus the C&T system can 
introduce efficiencies that can reduce costs for the utility, and the customer.  
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Transaction costs for the scheme need not be high if it operates under existing 
institutional frameworks. That is, the cap is informed by existing resource management 
plans developed in conjunction with environmental regulator guidance (e.g. abstraction 
limits), with billing via the water utility. A business unit would be required to run the TWUC 
trading website  W this role is taken on by the environmental regulator in the emission cases 
cited above (e.g. the US EPA for the acid gases scheme), but could be operated by the 
water utility with regulatory oversight, or a new company established to handle the trading.  
4. Vignettes: Water Cap and Trade examples  
The vignettes below provide some illustrative examples of how the scheme might 
operate. These examples relate to four participants in the market, commercial companies, 
residential households, an environmental pressure group, and a water utility.  
Example 1. Commercial sector 
Chromatec Ltd., a metal finishing business in Oldtown, uses a lot of process water but has 
never bŽƚŚĞƌĞĚǁŝƚŚǁĂƚĞƌĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŵƵĐŚ ?ĂƐŝƚ ?ƐĂƐŵĂůůƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǀĞƌĂůůĐŽƐƚƐ ?
PharmaGen , an international biotech company, operating from new build premises in a 
business park near EĞǁƚŽǁŶ ?ŽƚŚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?ǁĂƚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ?
ValleyDaůĞǁŚĞƌĞǁĂƚĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?ŝƐŚŝŐŚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚĚƌǇƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽǀĞƌ
the last 30 years have caused problems.  
The abstraction cap for ValleyDale is X Million m3/ yr. which reflects abstraction that is 
possible without environmental damage (e.g. ecologically low flow rivers) during a summer 
ŵŽŶƚŚŝŶĂ ?ŝŶ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƌĞƚƵƌŶƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ĚƌŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ ?ǁĂƚĞƌĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶsĂůůĞǇĂůĞŝƐ
twice this amount, so the C&T system seeks to cut demand by 50%. It is determined by the 
regulators that this will be done over 20 years.  
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Both companies have an allocation of TWUCs based on their past demand (Chromatec 
Ltd use more water than PharmaGen so were allocated more TWUCs initially, and receive 
more in the quarterly top up).  In the first year neither company pays much attention to the 
scheme, but by year two both are familiar with the scheme operation and are more water 
aware. PharmaGen has been growing quickly and its water demand has risen, and they no 
longer have the TWUCs they need. They consider conservation investment, but decide that 
ƚŚĞƌĞƚƵƌŶƐĂƌĞŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŽƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌǁĂƚĞƌĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶ-house, 
and enter the auction to purchase TWUCs to cover their deficit. Chromatec Ltd do not enter 
the auction as their TWUCs cover their use.  
Several years later, the annual reduction in total TWUCs available, and the consequent 
fall in quarterly top up, means that Chromatec Ltd have been spending a lot on TWUCs 
whose market price has been rising. They invest in water conservation processes and 
technology, based on guidance provided by a growing water conservation industry 
(technology and advice providers, environmental auditors etc.).  They reduce their demand 
and sell their spare TWUCs to offset some of their conservation investment.  
A few year later, the regulator lowers the cap to reflect a 1 in 50 year drought return 
period, giving greater protection to ValleyDale.  Both companies receive fewer TWUCs but 
Chromatec find this barely affects them due to their prior conservation investment, but 
WŚĂƌŵĂ'ĞŶĚĞĐŝĚĞŝƚ ?ƐŶŽǁĐŽƐƚ-effective to retrofit a rainwater harvesting tank and pump 
to flush the office toilets without using a piped supply. 
Example 2. Household sector 
The Smiths live in a decent sized flat in BigCity basin, a highly water stressed area. They 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇƚŚŝŶŬĂďŽƵƚǁĂƚĞƌŵƵĐŚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďŽƚŚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĂƚĞƌŝƐĂƐŵĂůůƉĂƌƚŽĨ
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outgoings. However, over the last two years they have had to enter the TWUC auction 
several times, and have noticed TWUC prices are rising. When their washing machine breaks 
down they buy a new one, selecting a highly water efficient device. The following year they 
have their bathroom remodelled and choose water efficient tap fittings and shower head. 
dŚĞǇĨŝŶĚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞdthƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚ ?ďƵƚĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞďŽƚŚĞƌĞĚƚŽƐĞůů ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ
ƐĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĨŽƌĂ ?ŶŽŶ-ƌĂŝŶǇĚĂǇ ? ?
The Jones, a family of four, live a few miles away in a detached house with a large 
garden, and two cars. They have found that since having to purchase TWUCs at the auction 
they are much more water aware and start to conserve water around the house, and the 
garden hose is used sparingly. They have  an extension built, and decide that they could 
cost-effectively install a rainwater harvesting system, collecting water from the roof, and 
storing in a tank in the garden so as to flush the toilets and water the garden in summer. 
Their bill drops such that they build up a healthy cushion of TWUCs. The two children leave 
ĨŽƌƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƐĨŝŶĚƚŚĞǇŶŽǁŚĂǀĞĂƐƵƌƉůƵƐŽĨdthƐ ?dŚĞǇŐŝĨƚƐŽŵĞƚŽ
their children and from next year, sell their surplus at the auction.  
The Anderson family live in a terraced house without a garden. Their water use has 
historically been quite low, so they received relatively few TWUCs in the initial allocation. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĚĞŵĂŶĚŚĂƐƌŝƐĞŶƋƵŝƚĞƐŚĂƌƉůǇĂƐDƌŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŚĞƌwho has a limiting 
illness and needs a lot of home care, has moved in with them.  ůƚŚŽƵŐŚDƌŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
mother gave him her surplus TWUCs when she moved in, their water bill is higher than  it 
ǁĂƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚdthƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇƋƵĂůŝĨǇĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?tĂƚĞƌƐƵƌĞ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŽĨĨĞƌƐĂssistance to low income and other 
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households (see section 5 below) they do not need to purchase additional TWUCs, and 
continue to receive financial support with respect to their bill. 
Example 3. The Chalk Rivers Alliance 
A national environmental pressure group, the Chalk Rivers Alliance, are concerned about 
some chalk streams routinely running well below flow requirements needed to maintain a 
healthy ecosystem.  The Chalk Rivers Alliance raise funds nationally through member 
donations, which are used to purchase TWUCs  on the open market for the regions with the 
at risk chalk rivers. They choose not to allocate the TWUCs to any companies/homes, 
 ?ƌĞƚŝƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚŝƐƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĨĞǁĞƌdthƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
overall, hence the price rises, further encouraging customers to invest in demand 
management. The Chalk Rivers Alliance thus speeds the descent to the cap in the region 
they are most concerned about. 
Example 4. The Water Utility 
>ĞĂŬĂŐĞŝƐĂďŝŐ ?ƵƐĞƌ ?ŽĨǁĂƚĞƌ, and could be excluded from the C&T system, and tackled 
in its current fashion, via K&tdƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĂŶĚ ?ĨŝŶĞƐ ? ?ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌŶŽŶ-
compliance. However, this does not display leadership in sustainable water management, 
and the water utility participates in the C&T market as a customer (as a legitimate user, and 
as one who  ?ƵƐĞƐ ?water via leakage). Previous year leakage estimates (OFWAT approved), 
are used as a basis for allocating TWUCs to the utility. The regulator then requires utilities to 
pay for use over that addressed by their TWUC allowance, at the market rate. Although this 
payment goes from and back to the utility the regulator requires that it must be re-invested 
in improving water security (e.g. leakage control, network connectivity, land management 
works to increase natural storage and groundwater recharge), and supporting social security 
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ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ?tĂƚĞƌ^ƵƌĞ ? ?dŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇalso sets up a spin-out business to meet 
demand for water conservation advice and equipment.  Value lost through water theft is 
also more explicit and the utility invests in a water theft reduction programme.  
5. Water Cap and Trade: FAQs 
Further work would be needed to develop and implement the C&T system, and initially 
research would be needed (similar to that for TEQs  W see section 6). Below we address some 
likely initial questions about the basic design and operation of the system.  
5.1  Allocation of credits based on historical use.  
Will past virtuous conservation behaviour ďĞ ?ƉƵŶŝƐŚĞĚ ?ďǇĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐĨĞǁdthƐ
compared to more profligate users?  Low users would receive fewer TWUCs, but would not 
be required to reduce demand as quickly as bigger users as the cap falls. We anticipate that 
a minimum TWUC allocation would be made, so that very low users (e.g. house 
construction to Code for Sustainable Homes level 5-6) with confirmed historic use at or 
below a specified level (e.g. at the equivalent cap level) would immediately receive more 
TWUCs than they need. These could be sold to generate an income.   
What period is used to determine the historical water use and hence the initial TWUC 
allocation? A billing year or years, for a period before the scheme becomes widely known, 
so as to avoid false inflation of initial allocation. For users with only a part year record, an 
annual record would be reconstructed using a scaling formulae agreed with the regulator.  
^ŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŝŶŝƚŝĂůĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƵƐĞƵŶĚĞƌĚƌŽƵŐŚƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? No. 
Initial allocations are a best reflection of current use, and the subsequent TWUC top up rate 
would fall to deliver a descent to the drought year cap over a period of years or decades. 
Under drought there is suppressed demand, where people would use more water to raise 
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welfare if they could, whereas under C&T they would have attained the desired welfare by 
modifying water use behaviour. Additionally, we also have poor information on actual 
water use under drought, with which to inform a drought sensitive allocation process.  
Must household TWUC allocation be based on historical use?  This is the preferred 
method as it relates most directly to actual use. In principle, TWUCs could be allocated on 
the historic use of a particular house type/size, with above average users getting fewer 
TWUCs than needed and so incentivised to be efficient, whilst below average consumers 
have TWUCs to sell, and so seek to continue to be efficient to maintain revenue.   
5.2  Moving house /premises 
What happens when people move home / company premises?  Customers have a 
TWUC account for their household or business, not the property  W ŝ ?Ğ ? “ƉĞŽƉůĞƵƐĞǁĂƚĞƌ
ŶŽƚďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐ ? ?/ĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĂTWUC surplus, say from downsizing home, then you can sell 
them, if you move and find you have fewer TWUCs than needed you may have to buy extra 
(or inveƐƚŝŶǁĂƚĞƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?tĂƚĞƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐǁŝůůĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĂƐĞůůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞŵŝƵŵĂŶĚ
will be a marketing feature.   
What happens when someone moves into newly constructed premises that have no 
water use history? The occupants will have a TWUC account to draw on to settle the utility 
bill as normal. The C&T body will not put new TWUCs into a new occupiers account (as this 
would require reduction in TWUCs elsewhere), so any TWUC deficit must be covered by 
purchase on the open market. Developers may do this on behalf of purchasers  as a sales 
incentive.  A C&T system will more quickly grow demand for new buildings that are more 
efficient than average (e.g. high level CSH homes or BREEAM rated commercial buildings).  
5.3  Changing  customer base  
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What happens with new customers who have not previously had a TWUC account?  
People moving from a non-C&T region (within or beyond England), or forming new 
households (young adults, divorcees etc.) may not have a TWUC account. They would need 
to open an account with the C&T body, and obtain TWUCs; these can be bought on the 
open market, provided by an employer, or gifted to them (e.g. from parents).  People 
moving from one C&T area to another would sell their TWUCs for the region they are 
leaving, and buy new ones for the destination region. Over the long term (decades), these 
demographic changes further drive a transition such that consumers would obtain all the 
TWUCs they need from the open market, not the quarterly free top up.  
What happens when people die, emigrate or their business closes?  TWUCs that are 
no longer required, but have not expired, are assets. These can be gifted, inherited or 
claimed by creditors. If not required by the recipient, they can be sold, and will last until 
their original expiration date (see 5.5). Over years the number of customers receiving a 
quarterly TWUC allocation from the utility will fall, and the C&T body can make this 
released share available via the open market, rather than via the water utility quarterly 
allocation (based on the grandfathered initial allocation).  
5.4  Application to rental households 
Recent changes to billing legislation make application of the scheme to the rental 
sector feasible. Rental properties account for a third of homes in the UK, evenly split 
between private and social renting, and historically  account for about 80% of household 
water debt (disconnection for non-payment has been illegal since 1999). The 2012 FWA 
ƉƵƚƐĂůĞŐĂůŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚĞŶĂŶƚ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĚĞƚĂŝůƐƚŽƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ?
and makes them legally responsible for unpaid bills if they do not.  Thus the mechanism for 
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tracing tenants, allocating liability and recovering costs can be used for TWUCs (or their 
fees) as well as conventional charges.  Those in social rented housing may currently pay for 
water as part of a single rental fee paid to the landlord (e.g. a local authority).  In this case, 
water conservation could be promoted by introducing a requirement for tenants to supply 
sufficient TWUCs to cover their water use (or that above a pre-determined cap), and/or by 
the landlord enabling conservation via upgrading to water efficient fittings and appliances 
5.5  dth ?ƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ? 
How long do TWUCs last?  Once surrendered, the TWUC expires. It must be 
surrendered within a set number of years, say five, after which it expires, thus ensuring 
demand conservation measures are continually incentivised in the market. Customers could 
be automatically alerted to upcoming expiration so old TWUCs could be used or sold.  
What if environmental groups retire all the TWUCs? This is extremely unlikely, as 
there will be millions of TWUCs (over a billion if all highly stressed areas participated) with a 
high collective worth (millions of pounds). Retiring TWUCs reduces their supply, so raised 
prices will also prevent NGOs from excessive retirement.  It is improbable to expect that an 
NGO will outcompete homes and businesses for all the required TWUCs.  
5.6  Private supplies and emergency use 
tŽŶ ?ƚexisting consumers on a private supply be penalised?  No. Current private 
supplies would be exempt from the scheme, although their use would be taken into 
account in calculating the cap (all private supplies require an abstraction licence from the 
Environment Agency). Applications for new licences  may need to be more heavily 
regulated (e.g. demonstrate no viable alternative to a private supply).  to prevent 
companies developing a private supply to avoid the C&T system.  
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How would large users such as farmers or golf courses investing in on-site water 
storage be affected?  Capturing and storing more water on-site (e.g. extensive RWH, or 
local impoundments) means drawing on existing sources less, so you may have TWUCs to 
bank. On-site storage is water conservation that the C&T system promotes, as it 
encourages less reliance on local abstraction or piped supply.  If any abstraction rights were 
surrendered these would be removed from the cap, but in practice surrender is unlikely as 
rights holders could gain an income from the TWUCs that retired abstraction represents.  
What about emergency use, such as fire-fighting? Emergency uses would be exempt 
but an estimate of their use would be made and subtracted from the drought year secure 
supply, leaving the cap for distribution. The estimate would specifically need to consider 
drought year requirements (e.g. it allows for greater usage due to moorland fire fighting).  
5.7  Equity and debt 
tŽŶ ?ƚƐŽŵĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƚŽŵĞĞƚtheir basic water needs?  It is important that 
needs are met, and households with high need plus low ability to purchase TWUCs are not 
penalised. Water utilities are not permitted to cut off the supply to any consumer who does 
not pay their bill. This situation would continue, with water debts handled under the C&T 
system just as they are now.  
What help would be available to households potentially faĐŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƚĞƌƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? ? A 
range of schemes currently exist to help low income households. These include a range of 
payment options (e.g. spreading the bill), trust fund/charitable payments (company pays 
ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞďŝůů ? ?ĂŶĚ ?tĂƚĞƌŝƌĞĐƚ ? ?ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐŝŶĂƌrears and on benefits have bills paid 
ǀŝĂƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? ?tĂƚĞƌ^ƵƌĞ ?ƚĂƌŐĞƚs  low income high need users, where qualifying 
households (on benefits with three or more dependent children, or on benefits and 
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suffering from a medical condition involving large uses of water) have their bills capped.  
Such schemes could be extended to  cover the purchase of any additional TWUCs required. 
Households who struggle to pay water bills, but are able to engage in conservation 
behaviour (e.g. they have no atypically high need for water, say for medical reasons), would 
benefit financially as their conservation may enable them to sell surplus TWUCs. 
Can the system help alleviate water debt?  The system would not fundamentally 
change how water companies address customers in debt (deserving households would still 
receive help with their bills, others would be subject to current debt collection procedures). 
The system is not designed to reduce debt, but works in the right direction (and is arguably 
a better industry response to debt than exists now) as households reducing consumption 
below their allowance can sell their surplus, water utilities purchasing TWUCs to cover 
leakage above that agreed with the regulator could have the expenditure hypothecated to 
service water debt (e.g. via the Water Sure scheme), whilst ultimately the water resource 
system will be more resilient to drought reducing need for supply side investment whose 
costs would otherwise be passed on to customers in higher bills.  
5.8  Scheme extent 
Should low water stress areas, such as the north of England bother with this system?  
No areas are  immune from drought. Drought planning occurs for all regions, with yield 
estimates under drought able to inform the cap. This process reflects water resource 
projections that address climate change, with the cap set to hedge against future risk, 
rather than being based solely on past observations of supply, an imperfect guide to the 
future. Lower stress areas would have a higher cap, so the descent to the cap would be 
more gradual, and the traded price of TWUCs lower, but operation of a C&T system would 
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deliver greater resilience. The system also incentivises development in areas where 
resource capacity is high, and discourages it where resources are highly stressed. Under 
current legislation, only regions in the south of England are classed as seriously stressed 
and hence readily able to meter all customers. Thus it is reasonable to expect that a C&T 
system might be introduced in the south first, and later extended  to other regions.  Note 
ƚŚĂƚůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂƌĞĂůƐŽůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞůŽǁĞƌŝŶ ?ǁĂƚĞƌƌŝĐŚ ?
areas; for example one UK water company in a low stress area has seven communities of 
over 100,000 people each, that are supplied from a single source and so vulnerable to 
localised drought (as well as failure in infrastructure).   
Will water utilities be able to trade?  Yes.  A water utility in a water rich area may 
supply a neighbouring water company using inter-regional connections. In undertaking to 
provide an agreed volume to a neighbouring company (inset agreement), the volume is 
removed / added from the respective regions resource estimates when calculating the cap. 
Fewer TWUCs may then be available for purchase in the supplying region (if it operates a 
scheme), but there will be revenue benefits to the supplying region and its customers. The 
receiving company adds the import to their resource estimate increasing their cap, enabling 
a more gradual descent to the cap, and deflating TWUC prices on the open market.  
5.9  Headroom 
ŽĞƐŶ ?ƚůŽǁĞƌŝŶŐĚĞŵĂŶĚůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ  ?ƌĞsponsive headroom ? (supply less 
demand  ?ƐĂĨĞƚǇŶĞƚ ? ?under drought as people are already engaged in water saving 
behaviour. Headroom may be reduced, but the system is designed to match demand to 
drought supply, so less headroom is needed. Reduced consumption via structural change 
(e.g. water efficient appliances) and temporary behavioural change (e.g. not watering 
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garden, shorter showers) would still be possible for many, although there may be consumer 
resistance to any encouragement to voluntarily reduce demand, hence it would be 
beneficial to descend to an appropriately demanding cap sooner rather than later.  
6. Conclusion  
Whilst 2012 proved an exceptionally wet year, we should remember that England is not 
getting wetter per se, but is experiencing greater extremes. The floods of 2012 came after 
two dry winters with economic impacts in some areas as serious as they were in the major 
drought of 1975-6 (Environment Agency, 2012).  Whilst flooding has been uppermost in the 
public conscious lately, we must also plan for those times when the pendulum inevitably 
ƐǁŝŶŐƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ ?>ŽƌĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƚŚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŝƌ ?ƌĞŵŝŶded us of this 
pointing to major UK climate extremes, with, in 2012 alone, major rivers such as the Tyne 
and Ouse both having their lowest and highest flows since records began, whilst a Met 
Office analysis suggests that the UK could experience a severe short-term drought, of the 
intensity experienced in 1975-6, once every decade (Burke et al., 2010). Rahiz and New 
(2013) predict that not only will droughts of the latter half of the 21
st
 century be longer and 
more intense, they are also likely to affect more regions at a time, limiting the extent to 
which water can be shared to defend against drought. Lord Smith warns that Britain must 
become more resilient to both flood and drought (Environment Agency, 2013b). 
Whilst climate change raises scarcity risk, demographic changes and economic growth 
are pushing up demand, exacerbating water stress. The population of the Wider South East 
and East Midlands is forecast to grow 23.2% from 2010-2035 with London growth projected 
at nearly 30% over this period (ONS, 2012). Longer term projections suggest major growth 
ďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ă ? ?A?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ
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over the 2010 base (ONS, 2011).  Rising water stress risks shortage that would damage 
economic development (e.g. business activity, restriction on dwellings needed house the 
necessary workers).  Water stress is being taken seriously, but it is doubtful whether current 
instruments are sufficient to weather a prolonged drought, without major impacts on the 
economy, well-being, and the environment.  
C&T has proved effective in the management of other common pool resources, and we 
believe that a water C&T system offers the potential to deliver greater resilience against 
drought than is possible with current water management approaches. The UK Parliament 
has already considered a C&T system, with respect to energy (TEQs), which it found to be 
technically feasible, but deferred adoption pending more evidence on its cost-benefit ratio 
relative to a cheaper upstream system (i.e. up the supply chain from the consumer) (Fleming 
and Chamberlin, 2011).  The economic benefits of TEQs were large, but so were the 
implementation costs, an estimated £0.7- £2 billion, to be paid from general taxation.  
We anticipate that a water C&T system would be more attractive and feasible than this. 
The scale of implementation is less (it can start for discrete high stress areas, water utilities 
in the SE) whilst cost savings may be substantial as fewer supply side schemes would be 
needed. The scheme is also simpler than TEQs (where there are myriad fuels with different 
greenhouse gas warming potentials), is likely more easily understood by the public, and 
could be implemented via incremental developments in existing institutional structures 
(utilities, regulators).  Of course, a water C&T system would represent a bold and radical 
development of water resource management for England, and  there is a gulf between 
concept and practice. An implementation strategy would need to be informed by prior 
evaluation of the proposal to identify impacts and barriers. This research would require 
34 
 
development of a suitable numerical model to, for example, examine impacts of prices, 
TWUC lifetime, a changing population base and so on.  More generally the research could 
usefully mirror the approach for TEQs, focussing on fit to strategic objectives, technical 
feasibility, cost-benefit appraisal, distributional impact assessment, and analysis of public 
acceptability.  
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Table 1. Limitations on application and efficacy of demand management interventions 
Approach Application and 
assumed benefit 
Implementation challenges 
Metering 
(volumetric 
charging) 
Demand reduction, 
calculated as product of 
count of metered 
properties and demand 
reduction per meter type 
(dumb, AMR, Smart) 
To date, most metered households in 
England are self-selected low users. 
Diminishing returns from compulsory 
enrolment is likely 
Retrofit metering of older flats difficult. Cost 
and uncertainty of forecast utility income 
Education Water conservation 
campaigns raise 
customer awareness of 
value of water and lead 
to reduced demand 
through behavioural 
change 
Poor evidence of effectiveness over long 
term.  Even under drought, customers may 
be unwilling to conserve unless water 
industry leads by example CCW (2006).  
Overseas studies suggest behaviour change is 
short lived, even with advice tailored to 
individual households (Fielding et al., 2013) 
Technology Displacement devices, 
low flush WCs, low flow 
fittings, shower timers 
Water efficient 
appliances (washing 
machines and 
dishwashers) 
Rainwater harvesting 
and grey water recycling 
systems 
 
Readily removed by householder if perceived 
to offer poor service.  Regulations (Water  
Supply Fittings 1999, Code for Sustainable 
Homes) not enforced post occupation  
Purchasers choose white goods primarily on 
cost and energy efficiency, although water 
efficiency is a greater consideration in water 
stressed areas (MVA, 2006)  
Householder apathy due to installation 
inconvenience, health concerns (Fewtrell and 
Kay, 2007), low roof to occupant ratio for 
flats, complex agreements for multiple 
occupancy buildings, and (Roebuck et al., 
2011) negative financial return 
Technology ineffective as short term drought 
response due to market installation capacity 
Network 
management 
Mains replacement 
reduces bursts and 
leakage 
 
Pressure reduction 
reduces bursts and 
leakage 
Utilities aim for economic level of leakage 
(find and fix cost v. value of water saved) set 
with respect to the long run average price of 
water, not its (drought) scarcity value  
Costs (e.g. booster pumps for tall buildings) 
to maintain service level 
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Table 2. Water Stress in England by Water Company  
 
 
Water Company  
Water Stress 
Score 
Water Stress 
Classification 
Households 
served 2011-12 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?
Households 
metered  
2011-12  (%) 
Essex and Suffolk Water 41 Serious 705.5 51.2 
Folkestone and Dover Water (now Veolia Water SE) 41 Serious 69.1 87.8 
Southern Water 40 Serious 962.7 60.3 
Thames Water  40 Serious 3322.7 30.9 
Three Valleys Water (now Veolia Water Central) 40 Serious 1180.2 40.2 
Portsmouth Water 39 Serious 282.1 18.9 
Sutton and East Surrey Water 39 Serious 256.8 36.1 
Cambridge Water 36 Serious 119.2 64.9 
South East Water  36 Serious 799.8 49.1 
Mid Kent Water (now part of South East Water) 36 Serious See South East Water 
Bournemouth and West Hampshire (now Sembcorp Water) 34 Serious 183.9 60.9 
Anglian Water 34 Serious 1893.1 69.5 
South Staffordshire Water 32 Moderate 520.0 27.7 
South West Water 31 Moderate 695.8 72.4 
Tendring Hundred Water (now Veolia Water East) 31 Moderate 68.7 74.3 
Severn Trent Water 29 Moderate 3150.6 36.2 
United Utilities 27 Low 2859.0 31.9 
Bristol Water 25 Low 467.0 38.2 
Northumbrian Water 25 Low 1061.7 25.3 
Yorkshire Water 25 Low 1971.0 41.4 
Cholderton and District Water 24 Low 0.7 20.5 
Wessex Water 22 Low 520.2 51.7 
Notes:  tĂƚĞƌƐƚƌĞƐƐĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŐĞŶĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞA? ? ?ŝƐůŽǁƐƚƌĞƐƐ ? ? ?- ? ?ŝƐŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?A? ? ?ŝƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?  
  Population and metering data from the regulator OFWAT 
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For on-line appendix: 
Non-metered customers 
How are non-metered customers addressed?  The scheme assumes that all 
customers are metered and this will likely  transpire in high stress regions, and perhaps 
ultimately all England.  Nationally, meter penetration is rising, with about 42% of dwellings 
metered (52%  in high water stress regions) and some companies are working actively 
towards universal metering. Meters can now be compulsorily fitted to customers in over 
ŚĂůĨƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂƌĞĂƐŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽǀĞƌ ? ?A?ŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐ ?dĂďůĞ ? ? ?
using powers granted by the Water Industry Regulations, 1999. The qualifying condition is 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƌĞĂŝƐ ?ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇǁĂƚĞƌƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚĚĞŵĂŶĚĂŶĚƐƵƉƉůǇ ?Ɛ
climate changes and/or projected demand increases, more areas may become seriously 
stressed.  It is just these high water stress areas that the C&T system is designed to address.  
Compulsory metering is allowed if a water utility can demonstrate it is the most efficient 
way of securing supplies.  Metering is assumed to be an efficient demand management 
device, but the evidence on this is equivocal (Table 1). A C&T system can deliver greater 
efficiencies than metering alone, and as it relies on volumetric data to make that efficiency 
possible, C&T is a justification for compulsory metering. Universal water metering is already 
a condition of successful agricultural quota systems (2030 WRG, 2013).  
Could C&T work with non-metered users? Possibly, although this likely presents 
complications so if a scheme were to cover non-metered users, it should be designed to 
encourage meter uptake. Note that water companies can if they wish meter every user 
 ?ŵŽƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚĚƵĞƚŽĐŽƐƚĂŶĚĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?ƚŚƵƐƚ ĞƌĞŝƐĂŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵĨŽƌ
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐŚŽǁŵĂŶǇ ?ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ?dthƐĂĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞďŝůůĞĚŽŶĂ
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metered basis. Utilities can only levy this volumetric charge if customers are metered and 
live in a seriously water stressed area, or display high use characteristics (have an automatic 
garden watering device,  a swimming pool, a power shower, >320 litre bath, or a reverse 
osmosis water softening unit). Thus a mechanism already exists for bringing the presumed 
highest water users into the C&T system.  Water utilities can also compulsorily meter and 
charge volumetrically on change of ownership of a property (1999 Water Act, section 7) if 
the new occupiers have not received an unmetered bill, providing another mechanism for 
bringing unmetered users into the C&T system. Given an average home move of every 10 
years, this will in the time scale of one to two decades result in a marked expansion of the 
metering base.  However whilst growing metering in this way would be uncontroversial, it 
would lose the cost effectiveness benefits of meter installation street by street, region by 
region, and leave incomplete data for water resource zones thus negating the information 
and water balance accuracy benefits of a progressive universal metering programme. 
How might non-metered users be encouraged to adopt the C&T system? All non-
ŵĞƚĞƌĞĚĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŚĂĚŽǁ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĂƚĂŽŶĞƐtimated usage and 
TWUCs would be included in their quarterly bill, with the aim of encouraging formal entry 
to the scheme. (i) A customer would receive an allocation of TWUCs based on estimated 
historic water use. This estimation would be made based on household characteristics  W 
demand forecasts required by the regulator have long used such an approach (Parker and 
Wilby, 2013), although estimates for individual households will clearly vary in accuracy 
more than area estimates. (ii) Customers would receive a quarterly top up to their TWUC 
account, calculated in the same way as for metered customers. (iii) On receipt of a water 
utility bill, customers would make the normal financial settlement, and their TWUCs would 
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be automatically deducted from their TWUC account (again based on estimated use).  As 
these are shadow TWUCs, the user cannot enter the market to buy/sell them.  
This process however, provides a route to encourage water conservation. High users 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĚǀŝƐĞĚĂƐƐƵĐŚ ? “ǇŽƵƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƵƐĞŝƐyA?Ăďove the average for people like you 
in the C&T scheme  W ƉůĞĂƐĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĞ ? ? ?ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂĚǀŝĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ? ?ĚǀŝƐŝŶŐĂ
consumer of their environmental performance relative to their neighbours is a more 
powerful instrument than information strategies that encourage conservation by raising 
awareness (Steg and Vlek, 2009).  The user would also be advised of the cost implications, 
should metering be made compulsory; their bill would indicate any TWUC shortfall and how 
much covering this deficit would cost at current rates. Similarly, illustrations of comparable 
households who have made savings, and the TWUC savings/income generated could be 
given. Users who believe they use less than their estimated use would be advised that 
metering would be beneficial, providing savings on both their conventional utility bill, and 
making them eligible to trade on the TWUC market, generating an income.  
 
